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INTRODUCTION
Hyperbole has now become the norm for introducing accounts of significant court decisions, with 'landmark judgment' the current favourite. So when on 26 July 2017 a seven-person Supreme Court (SC) held that the Employment Tribunals and Employment Appeal Tribunal Fees Order (the 'Fees Order') was unlawful and void ab initio, with the consequence that all fees for employment tribunal (ET) claims and EAT appeals ceased to be payable with immediate effect and all fees paid in the past were liable to be reimbursed, commentators began struggling for words. 1 'The biggest single victory in the history of employment law' was how one prominent blogger put it; 2 another persistent antagonist of tribunal fees, temporarily lost for words, resorted to a blog post consisting entirely of emojis. 3 Adding to the drama of Lord Reed explaining live the SC's reversal of the Court of Appeal -a result which few commentators had predicted -within hours ETs across the county began issuing notices telling claimants they no longer needed to pay any fees. The Fees Order has now disappeared from the Government's legislation website, confirming its erasure by, principally, the common law right of access to a court.
For once the extravagant acclamations were not hyperbolical. Since their introduction on 29 July 2013, tribunal fees resulted in a precipitate, consistent and sustained fall in the number of ET claims issued, as all the data show -a fall of around 67% in single cases and 72% in multiple cases, based on the official quarterly statistics. 4 According to estimates in the Government's own post-implementation review published shortly before the SC hearing, around 14,000 claimants each year did not issue claims because of fees. 5 The first set of published statistics of case receipts following the UNISON judgment already shows a resurgence of claims, with almost exactly a 100% increase in single claims for the months August and September 2017 compared with the year to June 2017. 6 The bill to the Government in reimbursing fees is estimated at £33 million, 7 and the effect of UNISON on claims dismissed or not brought because of fees is in the course of resolution. In the longerterm, the case has very significant implications for any fees regime or other impediments of access to ETs, courts or tribunals. Drawing on a conception of the rule of law which has not been clearly articulated in case-law before, the UNISON judgment marks a significant evolution of constitutional common law rights, 8 all the more important with Brexit on the horizon. the responsibility for enforcement of social rights is almost exclusively left to private individuals, such as in the sphere of employment rights. To that end, in section 2 I explain the historical development of what I call privatised social justice in relation to labour rights. In section 3 I show how the ideological and empirical assumptions which underpinned recent government policy towards employment rights, and in particular ET fees, had the effect of largely immunising policies against rational arguments in the political sphere. In sections 4-6 I explore the context of the fees challenge, showing how the conception of the rule of law recognised in UNISON combined with the common law right of access to the courts to provide a clearer and higher level of protection than the closely related legal standards in the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and in EU law. In section 7 I explore the short-term implications of the judgment, before considering in sections 8-9 its longer-term effects on fees and other barriers to adjudication, both in employment and beyond.
THE EMERGENCE OF PRIVATISED SOCIAL JUSTICE
Prior to the Redundancy Payments Act 1965, at a time dominated by collective laissez-faire, the little protective labour legislation that existed was mostly the subject of criminal sanctions and state enforcement. This included, of course, the early factories legislation but extended to the Truck Acts on payment of wages which were enforced by factory inspectors. 9 It was a criminal offence for an employer without reasonable excuse to fail to provide written terms of employment as required by the Contracts of Employment Act 1963. 10 The 1965 Act marked the turn in the tide, of using individual claims in ETs instead of state enforcement as the primary means of delivering labour standards. The process accelerated after the Donovan Commission proposed that all contractual or statutory disputes between employers and individual employees (except personal injury claims) should be directed to industrial tribunals, in order to ensure a hearing in a single jurisdiction which was 'easily accessible, informal, speedy and inexpensive '. 11 The result is that today, in contrast to the old Truck Acts, a deduction from wages claim, along with almost all other rights conferred by the Employment Rights Act 1996 (ERA), may only be brought by a claimant in the ET 'and not otherwise', 12 the default means for enforcing the vastly expanded range of employment rights introduced since 1965. The paradigmatic model is threefold: first, legislation which confers a right on an individual worker or employee; second, a right which is enforced by an individual bringing a claim in the ET, usually exclusively; and, third, a remedy confined to the loss to the individual, usually but not always based 9 See e.g. the Truck Act 1831, the Truck Amendment Act 1887 and the Truck Act 1896. The history to these Acts is set out in Bristow v City Petroleum [1988] There are, of course, exceptions to the individual enforcement paradigm, and if anything they have grown in recent years. Workplace personal injury claims were always a case apart, as the Donovan Commission recognised, and now the contrast with the default norm is starker still. For as a result of changes made by the previous coalition Government eliminating the long-standing right for workers to bring civil claims for breach of safety legislation, 13 health and safety regulations are now enforced exclusively by criminal sanctions and inspections and enforcement by the HSE. 14 Another significant exception is the National Minimum Wage Act 1998 (NMWA), which uses three methods of enforcement, supplemented by a 'name and shame' policy: individual claims in the ET or ordinary courts for breach of contract or unlawful deductions; enforcement action by HMRC, which includes bringing claims to recover underpayments on behalf of the workforce, supplemented by significant financial penalties payable to the government; 15 and criminal prosecutions brought for refusals or wilful neglect to pay the national minimum wage. 16 Elsewhere the Pensions Regulator investigates possible breaches of pension law in the absence of a complaint, 17 and the Pensions Ombudsman addresses scheme 'maladministration'. 18 In recent years state-backed enforcement has been rediscovered as the principal means of addressing some of the worst kind of labour abuse, such as 'gangmasters' and modern slavery, overseen by the renamed Gangmasters and Labour Abuse Authority (GLAA) and the Anti-Slavery Commissioner respectively, and adopting techniques such as licensing and prevention orders in addition to criminal offences. 19 Other departures from the paradigm include the investigatory powers of the Equality and Human Rights Commission (EHRC) in relation to discrimination legislation; 20 legislation where trade unions or employee representatives bring a claim on behalf of the workforce as These exceptions illustrate the potentially diverse means of giving effect to labour rights, and how the degree of state involvement is on a spectrum, ranging from the state taking sole responsibility for investigation and bringing actions at one end, to its merely providing the forum which hears the dispute between the parties at the other, with many variations in between. The exceptions also serve to prove the rulethat the vast majority of employment rights in the UK are enforced by individual claimants bringing claims for their individual loss, with state assistance restricted to the provision of the ET in which claims are heard and of court machinery elsewhere for enforcement of judgments (for which a fee is payable 25 The Fees Order soon turned the spotlight on this neglected issue. The immediate precipitous drop in ET claims following the introduction of fees exposed the vulnerable keystone underpinning the entire edifice of workers' rights. In these circumstances calls for alternative, supplementary or 'reflexive' methods of delivering labour rights appeared as so many utopian dreams. Instead, writers such as Busby and McDermont wrote of the urgent need to protect and reinforce the individual enforcement model itself, with a more simplified, inquisitorial system, greater assistance for unrepresented claimants and improved enforcement mechanisms. 35 Individuals already met many types of impediment to practical 'access to justice' in the ET, diminishing the extent to which the risk of legal claims steered employers in the right direction; but none was as plainly visible in its legal operation or factual effects as the Fees Order, and as a result none had the same potential to undermine the legitimacy of a system based on privatised social justice.
RECENT GOVERNMENT POLICY AND THE NEGLECTED PUBLIC FUNCTION OF ET CLAIMS

A. The Themes of Recent Policy
If the implicit premise of the academic critiques was that the system should deliver labour standards in general, recent government policy, whether New Labour, coalition or Conservative, saw things from a very different angle. It has tended to focus on the costs of ET claims to businesses and the tax-payer, with weak or unmeritorious claims the particular target and heading off claims or promoting alternative methods of dispute resolution as the possible solutions. 47 The document failed to mention that this increase was overwhelmingly due to multiple claims, and in particular one very large multiple for underpaid annual leave in the airline sector where claims were reissued every three months for limitation reasons, as explained in the official statistics. 48 In fact single claims, which are less volatile than multiples, had only increased by 14% over the previous year, 49 hardly surprising in the context of the recession with an increase in dismissals and redundancies. But, untroubled by the detail, the Government also emphasised concerns raised by businesses about the costs of ET claims and the problem of weak claims. 50 Among a wide range of proposals in Resolving Workplace Disputes designed to reduce the number and cost of ET claims, only one gave any consideration to improving the systemic delivery of labour rights: a proposal that employers found to have infringed employment rights should pay a financial penalty to the state pour encourager les autres. 51 Following objections from businesses and in the Government-commissioned Beecroft report 52 , the proposal was watered down to a discretionary penalty which an ET could only award where a breach had 'aggravating features', its original objective soon forgotten. 53 In the event, enacted as s.12A of the Employment Tribunals Act 1996, the redrafted provision turned out to be almost completely irrelevant in practice, with a total of just 18 penalty orders made (of which a grand total of 12 were paid) over three years after it came into force. 54 The objective of incentivising settlements and disincentivising unreasonable claims made predictions which, in principle, were susceptible to testing against the empirical effects of fees. But the primary objective, that users should pay fees for the service, was mostly an ideological claim which drove an ineluctable result. There were at least two fundamental problems with this approach, both connected to privatised social justice.
The first, as explained by Adams and Prassl in a highly influential article and as emphasised by counsel for UNISON in her submissions to the SC, was that the Government's approach entirely ignored the public benefit of ET claims. The ET and EAT are completely subsidised by the taxpayer at present. Their services are therefore provided free of charge to users, which means that consumption is higher than would be the case under full cost recovery. Economic theory holds that in a conventional market this higher level of consumption results in a technical 'deadweight' loss to society as the additional costs to the taxpayer.
A footnote in a tiny font made explicit what was already implicit in the last sentence: 61 This assumes that there are no positive externalities from consumption. In other words ET and EAT use does not lead to gains to society that exceed the sum of the gains to consumers and producers of those services.
The theoretical exclusion of any wider benefits from ET claims was all the more striking because the consultation papers on fees placed a negative externality at the forefront of the justifications for fees -that is, that fear of ET claims deterred employers, and especially small businesses, from taking on workers. 62 The second problem related to fixing the price and how it would affect demand from 'users'. These elements exposed the flimsy foundations of the modelling. Both in the consultation and the Impact Assessment, the Government cited MoJ research in 2007 as suggesting ET claimants would 'not be highly price sensitive to fee-charging' because, for example, the principal motivations of court users were 'getting justice' and 'getting a final decision'. 63 But both documents acknowledged that the actual impact could not be predicted. 64 Taking a relaxed attitude to this uncertainty, by the time of the Impact Assessment the Government had already fixed the final 'price' for Type A and Type B claims. 65 The fees were less than the calculation of the average estimated cost per case, 66 but counsel for the Lord Chancellor was unable to offer any explanation to the SC why fees had been set at the level they were. 67 Nevertheless, the Impact Assessment used these figures and mathematical assumptions about the effect of pricing on claimant behaviour (which it conceded were not based on any reliable data) to predict a small decline in ET claims due to fees. 68 Even at an early stage, these predictions looked extremely dubious. In fact, for example, the 2007 MoJ research, based on a survey of civil and family cases using a 'robust' phone survey, 69 had found that money claims -which includes almost all ET claims -were the most liable to be deterred by fees, so that where fees became a larger proportion of the claim 'or even larger than the claim itself, this could deter [claimants] from proceeding to court'. 70 But without any reliable data on the price elasticity of demand, it was not possible to measure the loss of utility suffered by those claimants who were put off by fees, as the Impact Assessment acknowledged. 71 By the same token, nor was there any reliable information on whether 'price' was set to maximise revenue. Compounding an already flimsy analysis, in the SC the Lord Chancellor maintained that higher fees would generate higher revenue, described by Lord Reed as an error of 'elementary economics '. 72 Buried in the small print of the Impact Assessment, these two problems entailed conclusions which ought to have led to questioning the fundamental assumptions. The costs, on this model, were calculated as the actual costs to claimants of fees, plus some costs to employment lawyers and to the MoJ's administration in processing fees. 73 The costs to claimants were more than offset by the corresponding monetary benefits to taxpayers, respondents and the court system accruing from fees and the predicted reduction in claims. 74 But, according to the Impact Assessment, claimants who were deterred by fees also benefited financially owing to the various expenses in making a claim, such as the costs of legal representation, estimated at £1,300 on 68 The Impact Assessment, n. 59, used two alternative assumptions, based on no reasons: that the number of cases declined by 1% for every £1 (the 'low response scenario'; or that it declined by 5% for every pound (the 'high response scenario'): see para. 4.14 (the para. wrongly refers to 0.01% and 0.05%, when it means 1% or 5%). On the low response scenario, therefore, an issue fee of £160 would deter 1.6% of claimants and one of £250 would deter 2.5% of claimants; on the high response scenario the issue fee of £160 would deter 8% of claimants, while a fee of £250 would deter 12.5%. These low percentages should be further adjusted downwards to take account of the significant proportion of claimants granted remission, whom the Impact Assessment assumed would be unaffected by feecharging: para. average. 75 The modelling assumed that claimants overall gained from not pursuing ET claims, so that fees would assist in steering the unregenerate in accordance with their economic self-interest, saving them collectively between £2 million and £6 million each year. 76 Thus fees would result in the best of all possible worlds for everyone except employment lawyers. Pushed to its endpoint, the logic of these assumptions would be the abolition of ETs, for then taxpayers, respondents, the MoJ and even claimants would all save money.
This conclusion signalled a serious problem with the model's theoretical exclusion of any wider public benefit from ET claims. The model was also vulnerable to attack from another angle. Consistent with its empirical prediction of only a small drop in claims, the Impact Assessment assumed there would in fact be 'no significant changes in workplace behaviour beyond the reduction in demand for ET and EAT services as a result of fee-charging'. 77 However, if in fact the reduction in claims was higher than predicted, and if the reduced risk of an ET claim translated into lower general observance of labour standards, this would undermine both the empirical assumption that labour standards in general would not be affected by fees and the Impact Assessment's theoretical premise that there were no positive externalities in ET claims.
Despite the model's vulnerability, both theoretically and empirically, the Government stuck doggedly to its position during the consultation, perhaps because it was always the ideological cart driving the empirical horse. For example, when respondents raised the potential detrimental 'wider societal impacts' of fewer discrimination claims, alluding to the public function of ET claims, the Government's response was as follows: 78 we do not accept that it is only the threat of the employment tribunal that forces businesses to abide by their legal obligations. The Government supports a wide range of guidance, advice provision and help-lines which help businesses to observe their legal responsibilities and helps employees to understand their rights. There is also independent research that highlights the potential benefits for employers from fostering a diverse workforce. The response, as if straight from the mouth of Dr Pangloss, came close to asserting that legal claims were unnecessary to make employers comply with their legal obligations. But, critically, it fitted with the assumptions and theorising in the Impact Assessment. The Government gave similar short shrift to the argument that it was unfair claimants should bear fees when, as its own research showed, 79 many ET awards were not paid at all, simply stating 'we expect all parties to abide by the decision of the tribunal and pay awards and fees as ordered'. 80 All the evidence showing that claimants would pay fees which they would not recover even if successful -in effect making them, not the state, the guarantors of the whole systemwas defeated by another Panglossian riposte.
The market-based theorising which drove the introduction of fees was, therefore, largely immunised against challenges. Competing normative arguments not based on cost-benefit analyses were ruled out in advance, and in any case the principle of fees was never the subject of the consultation, which only covered the detailed means of implementation. Empirical assumptions were based on no or unreliable evidence, and counter-arguments were swiftly dismissed with assertions, not evidence, a recurrent theme of recent policy. 81 Once stripped of its evidential support, the principal justification amounted to little more than a clunky syllogism: users should pay for private services, ET claimants were using a service exclusively for their private purposes, and therefore they should pay for it. Within the horizon of such an ideology, the potential to influence fees through rational discourse in the political sphere was minimal. rest breaks under the Working Time Regulations, which cannot be brought as a series and typically result in no or very little financial loss, 84 were the most expensive (Type B), whereas claims for unpaid holiday, which usually involve some financial loss (albeit often small), were Type A. 85 Many other claims for detriments typically involving no or small compensation and for which sometimes awards for injury to feelings are specifically excluded were also categorised as Type B, even though they apply to workers who tend to have low pay or poor job security. 86 The reasons for these anomalies have never been clarified. and indirect discrimination. The arguments based on equivalence and breach of the public sector duty were later dropped, and I shall not discuss them. Nor will I examine the indirect sex discrimination argument, which ultimately succeeded in the SC but for reasons which mostly echoed the claim based on the common law right of access to a court and the related principles in EU law. 94 UNISON's claims were unsuccessful in both Divisional Courts, and appeals against both rulings were dismissed by the CA. 95 As to the argument based on effective access to the courts, Underhill LJ, with whom Davis LJ and Moore-Bick LJ agreed, decided that the issue turned essentially on Article 6 ECHR, as reflected in Article 47 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. 96 He distilled the legal analysis under EU law on effectiveness and Article 6 ECHR to a single 'essential question...whether the claimant can, in practice, pay the fee', 97 entailing an examination of the financial means of actual or hypothetical individuals. Though he referred to matters such as the importance of the underlying social rights, the low level of ET awards and the poor record of enforcement of ET awards and found the decline in claims 'troubling', 98 none of this evidence was relevant to answering that 'essential question'. In light of that legal test, the first Divisional Court's finding that the hypothetical claimants proposed by UNISON could realistically afford fees was not obviously wrong. 99 Moreover, adjustment to the extra-statutory guidance on exceptional remission could rescue any problematic individuals who could not realistically afford fees. 100 A legal test with an exclusive focus on an individual's means thus dictated the result.
UNISON'S CHALLENGE AND THE POST-FEES WORLD
As the case progressed through the courts' hierarchy, the blurred evidential picture came into sharper focus, tending to undermine the aims or assumptions used to justify the Fees Order. Undermining the assumptions of the Impact Assessment, the 2013 Survey of Employment Tribunal Application (SETA) found that compensation and reinstatement, not 'justice' were claimants' main motivations; that a hypothetical fee of £250 would have influenced the decision to bring an ET claim of 49% of claimants, and would be most likely to affect younger claimants, unrepresented claimants and claimants in temporary jobs, on low salaries or bringing wages claims (which are of low value); but that the ultimate case outcome was not a significant factor after controlling for other characteristics. 101 SETA also supplemented evidence in the official statistics as to the low level awards for unfair dismissal and discrimination claims, 102 finding median awards of £3,500 for breach of contract, £900 for wages claims, £2,800 for redundancy payments and £1,000 for 'other' claims. 103 Moreover, the actual amounts recovered were much lower: a 2013 BIS survey on payment of tribunal awards found that only 41% of awards were paid in full without enforcement and, even after taking account of enforcement, still 35% of claimants were paid nothing, said to be a 'particular concern' in light of fees. 104
Later data confirmed that actual claimants were nowhere near as resistant to the effect of fees as the Impact Assessment and consultation documents predicted. The effect of fees on the number of claims issued is well documented in the official statistics and has been fully explained by others. 105 While the precise decline became hazier once it became compulsory to notify ACAS of a claim in May 2014, 106 the continuing deterrent effect of fees was underlined by ACAS-sponsored research, based on actual workers who used pre-claim conciliation. Of those claimants who did not settle their claim in conciliation and decided not to bring an ET claim, the most common reason given was fees (26%); of that sub-group, 68% said it was because they could not afford the fee, 19% said it was more than they were prepared to pay and 9% said the fee equalled the money owed. 107 As for those claimants who brought claims which were dismissed because they did not pay the hearing feesomething not recorded in the official statistics -a later study found a fifth of those who subsequently withdrew the claim did so because of the hearing fee. 108 In addition, the number of claimants who obtained remission was far lower than predicted. 109 None of this evidence, however, necessarily undermined the logic of the CA's analysis. Indeed, subsequent adjustments to the extra-statutory guidance on exceptional remission, made to address the CA's minor criticisms of the gap between the previous guidance and the CA's test of realistic affordability, 112 appeared to strengthen the Lord Chancellor's hand on appeal: if an individual could not afford the fee but fell outside the strict remission criteria, exceptional remission could come to the rescue. Nor did it deflect the Government from its position, exemplified by the long-awaited post-implementation Review, eventually published in January 2017 after being promised three years earlier in the course of the first judicial review. 113 The Foreword by Sir Oliver Heald explained that 'the introduction of fees has broadly met its objectives', pointing to the money raised by fees and the facts that more people were using ACAS conciliation and 'many people' still issued ET claims. 114 In that light, the proposed changes to the fees regime were very minor: some tinkering with the thresholds of gross monthly income for remission to bring them in line with the national living wage, but leaving the capital thresholds untouched, and exempting from fees those very few claims against the Secretary of State where an employer cannot pay certain payments owing to insolvency. 115 But the broad brush strokes of the Foreword could not hide the detail in the Review. The sums raised by fees were much lower than predicted, principally because the fall the figure for 2015/16 was 5,219 and for 2016/17, 5,719: see in claims was so high, and even ignoring what appear to have been some highly dubious assumptions in the calculations; 116 there had been no improvement in the success rate of claims post-fees, despite some attempts to massage the trends; 117 and it was meaningless to assert that fees had encouraged the use of ACAS conciliation when this had been compulsory since 2014. 118 As for access to justice, combining the findings from the research of Downer et al. 119 with the actual number of notifications of ET claims received by ACAS 120 resulted in an estimated 8,000 people who did not issue ET claims because of inability to afford fees. 121 Add to those the significant percentage of claimants whom fees put off presenting an ET claim for other reasons, such as the fee being more than they were prepared to pay or equalling the money owed, 122 and the estimated claimants who did not bring claims because of fees reached 14,000 annually. 123 Even this total was an underestimate of the full deterrent effect because it ignored the significant proportion of claimants who withdrew claims or had them dismissed owing to the significantly higher hearing fee. 124 Despite the Government's recalcitrance in the face of the evidence, it is probably no coincidence that soon after the Fees Order was introduced the Government gave renewed attention to other means of enforcing labour rights. Perhaps embarrassed at how fees had undermined the individual enforcement paradigm yet politically and ideologically committed to them, instead of abolishing fees the Government created more exceptions to the paradigm. Supreme Court had faced personal criticism. 133 The feeble response of the Lord Chancellor, Elizabeth Truss, notable for the absence of any condemnation of the press reporting, 134 led the then President of the Court, Lord Neuberger, to state that the attacks threatened the rule of law. 135 The UNISON case showed that the rule of law still had teeth, a nasty beast that would defend itself when cornered.
THE RULE OF LAW AND ACCESS TO COURTS
The rule of law is a protean concept, usually divided into formal and substantive conceptions. 136 Formal conceptions typically include in their desiderata of a legal system a right of access to the courts, so that the law provides a remedy as an integral aspect of the underlying individual legal right. 137 Substantive conceptions, on the other hand, attempt to supplement the list by adding rights derived from underlying theories of justice, typically invoked as a constraint on government powers or parliamentary sovereignty, with Dworkin usually cited as the exemplar. 138 The work of Trevor Allan is a sophisticated attempt to tip-toe between these positions, arguing that the rule of law implicitly entails a commitment to equal citizenship. 139 So far as I can tell, however, there has been limited attention in these theories to whether the rule of law entails that legal rules are in practice delivered at the systemic level, whether by state-backed sanctions, individual legal claims or other methods. In his comprehensive account of the meanings of the rule of law, for example, Lord Bingham includes a sub-rule that means are provided for resolving civil disputes without prohibitive cost; but he views this as an integral element of any individual right, unconnected with the delivery of systemic goals. 140 Glimpses within the theories of the need for effective legal remedies are rarely linked explicitly to the realisation of social goals. 141 This systemic dimension was largely absent, too, from the case-law prior to 133 See e.g. Mailonline at http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3903436/Enemies-
UNISON. The rule of law is mentioned in the preamble to the ECHR and in Golder v
United Kingdom the Court referred to it in holding that a right of access to the courts was implicit in Article 6. 142 But while Article 6 is intended to guarantee rights that are 'practical and effective', its focus is on the right of access as a necessary means to vindicate the individual's civil right, and not any wider function of such claims. 143 The furthest the cases go, it seems, is some fleeting recognition that if an individual has to pay a court fee which eats into compensation, this is liable to dissuade victims in general from bringing claims. 144 The common law right of access to a court longpre-dates the ECHR 145 and as early as Raymond v Honey 146 it began to draw on the case-law from Strasbourg, also treating the right as a necessary concomitant of individual civil rights, consistent with formal theories of the rule of law, without articulating any deeper normative justifications. 147 EU law ought to be more promising, because it begins not with the individual right but with the need to ensure EU laws are effective in a Member State -that is, at the systemic level. An early expression of this viewpoint was the principle of effectiveness, the foundation of which was the duty of co-operation in, now, Article 4(3) of the Treaty on the European Union (TEU) requiring Member States to take any appropriate measures to ensure fulfilment of EU law. 148 Usually expressed in the mantra that national procedural rules must not make it 'practically impossible or excessively difficult' to enforce rights conferred by Community law, 149 this principle is supplemented by the duty owed by Member States to ensure that Directives are fully effective within their legal system, 150 entailing effective remedies with a real deterrent effect. 151 But since Johnston 152 these state-oriented duties have become inextricably entwined with the principle of effective judicial protection of an individual's legal rights, inspired by Article 6 ECHR and now enshrined in Article 47 of the EU Charter. 153 The failure clearly to distinguish the two sets of principles -one looking to the Member State, the other protecting an individual right -has led to a degree of incoherence in the case-law on access to the courts, in which the ECJ sometimes uses one principle as the primary focus, sometimes the other, and sometimes both, but without explaining why. 154 Nevertheless, prior to UNISON it was EU law which went furthest in drawing an express link between individual legal claims and the delivery of systemic goals. In Coote the ECJ held that the duty on Member States to achieve the result of the (then) equal treatment Directive would be 'deprived of an essential part of its effectiveness' if the Directive did not extend to protect ex-employees against measures taken by their former employer in retaliation for discrimination proceedings brought by the worker. 157 While the ECJ referred to the individual right of effective judicial protection recognised in Johnston, its reasoning drew on the potential detrimental effect to achieving systemic goals if individuals did not have such protection: 158
Fear of such measures, where no legal remedy is available against them, might deter workers who considered themselves the victims of discrimination from pursuing their claims by judicial process, and would consequently be liable seriously to jeopardise implementation of the aim pursued by the Directive.
The fundamental objective, of arriving at real equality of opportunity, overrode any indications in the wording of the Directive that it did not extend to protect against victimisation of ex-employees. 159 UNISON marks a new development of the principles of the previous domestic, ECtHR and ECJ cases. Lord Reed's felicitous language, already much cited, neatly undermined the premise of the Government's assumptions in the consultation: 162 At the heart of the concept of the rule of law is the idea that society is governed by law. Parliament exists primarily in order to make laws for society in this country. Democratic procedures exist primarily in order to ensure that the Parliament which makes those laws includes Members of Parliament who are chosen by the people of the country and are accountable to them. Courts exist in order to ensure that the laws made by Parliament, and the common law created by the courts themselves, are applied and enforced. That role includes ensuring that the executive branch of government carries out its functions in accordance with the law. In order for courts to perform that role, people must in principle have unimpeded access to them. Without such access, laws are liable to become a dead letter, the work done by Parliament may be rendered nugatory, and the democratic election of Members of Parliament may become a meaningless charade. That is why the courts do not merely provide a public service like any other.
The analysis takes for granted that access to courts is a necessary element to vindicate an individual's right as Article 6 ECHR, Johnston and the domestic case-law already recognised; but in addition it encapsulates three wider elements of the rule of law, not previously articulated in such clear terms in domestic, EU or ECtHR caselaw.
The first is that some cases establish points of general principle and settle issues which are unclear for those beyond the litigants concerned. 163 The second element goes to systemic effectiveness, already foreshadowed in his reference to 'society governed by law'. For the law to steer behaviour in general, there must in fact exist the likelihood of a remedy against those who break it -even if 'enforcement of the law is not usually necessary'. 164 This applies most clearly in the employment context where perceived employer interest and legal rights rarely coincide: for the 'shadow' When Parliament passes laws creating employment rights, for example, it does not do so merely in order to confer benefits on individual employees, but because it has decided that it is in the public interest that those rights should be given effect....It is thus claims brought before an ET which enable legislation to have the deterrent and other effects which Parliament intended.
The result is a very powerful conception of the rule of law. The unstated premise of Lord Reed's second element is that there must exist some means of giving practical effect to laws by means of effective sanctions, not necessarily individual claims. In the absence of effective enforcement by criminal or other means, individual ET claims alone stabilise expectations. If this element is properly characterised as a formal quality of law, it is an aspect largely overlooked by those formal theorists who focus only on the link between an individual legal right and a remedy. 166 The connection with Parliamentary democracy provides a strong normative underpinning for systemic effectiveness, albeit one which does not specify any particular content to the laws. These two elements, practical systemic effectiveness and Parliamentary democracy, operate synergistically, combining most powerfully where achievement of the underlying legislative goals is a matter of high social importance, such as in relation to laws combatting discrimination. 167 Lord Reed's conception is therefore neither purely a formal theory nor one which specifies particular substantive rights as part of an underlying theory of justice. In Osborn he had already referred to theories of the rule of law. 168 None were cited in UNISON -perhaps because Reed's conception breaks with traditional analyses -but I think the work of Habermas is the most closely-related theoretical elaboration. 169 For Habermas, a valid legal norm requires that the state ensures 'average compliance, compelled by sanctions if necessary', so that the law steers those addressees who act strategically towards it as well as those who internalise its values. 170 But in addition to achieving social co-ordination, law embodies a claim to 165 Ibid., para. 72. 166 For example, Raz (n. 137) sees easy access to the courts as a necessary aspect of the law providing effective guidance and protection to an individual. legitimacy. In a modern legal order, characterised by a plurality of world views and lacking a shared religion, this can only be drawn from a procedural model of democratic self-determination, in which 'citizens should always understand themselves also as authors of the law to which they are subject as addressees'. 171 A system which fails to ensure effective compliance with democratically-decided laws fails its citizens in both capacities.
But once you descend from the rarified heights of Habermas' writing -very long on theory but very short on empirical examples -and examine an actual legal system, things become much messier. The two strands, systemic effectiveness of laws and their democratic genesis, may exhibit tensions. For example, Parliament may enact employment rights with limited remedies for breach, with the consequence that their general deterrent effect is restricted. One familiar example in domestic law is capped damages. Here, on the UK constitutional model, the common law would be pretty powerless to act in the name of systemic effectiveness. Viewed in comparison to EU law, where the systemic orientation of the effectiveness principle has generated an overriding requirement of effective and deterrent remedies, 172 the common law doctrine, of no right without a remedy, appears rather feeble. 173 Tensions of a different sort were present in UNISON. Parliament had simultaneously enacted legislation conferring rights on employees yet had also authorised, via s.42 TCEA 2007, the introduction of regulations prescribing fees which could potentially restrict systemic effectiveness by deterring claims. It is unclear how an abstract, high level theory of the rule of law would resolve these tensions, caused by a Janus-faced legislature. To address them Lord Reed ostensibly drew upon conventional tools of judicial review. But his background conception of the rule of law chimes with the limited weight given to secondary legislation on orthodox domestic principles because the Fees Order was in tension with the many employment rights enacted directly by Parliament in primary legislation; and it strengthens the common law right of access to justice, because of the triple function of ET claims in vindicating individual rights, contributing to systemic effectiveness and respecting parliamentary democracy.
THE COMMON LAW RIGHT: ITS LEGAL AND EVIDENTIAL TESTS
On one view, Lord Reed merely reaffirms the priority of the common law over the ECHR in protecting fundamental rights, as he earlier emphasised in Osborn, 174 The original principle, formulated by a divided CA in a case where a vexatious litigant triumphed over the Solicitor-General, was that a barrier to bringing proceedings, can only be prevented by clear, express words in a statute. 176 From this grew two supplementary principles, both of which informed Lord Reed's judgment. First, the need for authorisation by clear statutory words applies not only to absolute prohibitions but also to hindrances or impediments to effective access to courts, such as requirements to pay fees. 177 Second, in accordance with the development of proportionality as a common law principle, even where a statutory power authorises intrusion on the right of access, 'it is interpreted as only authorising such a degree of intrusion as is reasonably necessary to fulfil the objectives of the provision in question'. 178 But the strength of the principles only becomes clear in examining Lord Reed's more detailed formulation and application of them in UNISON.
A. Effectively Preventing Access to Justice
The first principle requires that fees must not effectively prevent access to justice. In the absence of any express authorisation in the enabling legislation for an interference with access to ETs, Lord Reed considered that the relevant legal question was whether there was a 'real risk that persons will be effectively prevented from having access to justice', endorsing the test of Dyson LJ in the Divisional Court in R(Hillingdon) LBC v Lord Chancellor. 179 Though Lord Reed's formulation is very similar to how the test was expressed by Underhill LJ in the CA also based on Hillingdon -'the Fees Order will be unlawful if its provisions create a real risk that some claimants will be denied access to justice because they cannot realistically afford the fees' 180 -his application of it is radically different. Whereas Underhill LJ considered evidence from actual or 'well-constructed cases of notional individuals' was necessary, with the consequence that evidence relating to matters such as the fall in claims or the ineffectiveness of the enforcement regime bore little if any weight, 181 Lord Reed instead focussed on systemic effects based on a wide range of empirical evidence: the dramatic decline in claims; the evidence given by claimants in the ACAS-sponsored research; the income of hypothetical claimants; the limited effect in practice of the power to grant exceptional remission; and, echoing the analysis of On Underhill LJ's approach a court should examine whether an individual can pay the fee -not a straightforward forensic exercise given the uncertain boundary between essential and inessential expenditure 184 -and any remedy would presumably be restricted to adjusting the guidance on exceptional remission or giving a declaration in respect of the individual claimant. Little wonder that in the SC counsel for the Lord Chancellor placed at the forefront of their submissions an argument that the Fees Order was not inherently unlawful because of the exceptional remission gateway, relying on authorities on the high threshold for systemic challenges. 185 . But Lord Reed's approach cuts this argument off at the root: fees 'have to be set at a level everyone can afford' -the plural is a clue -which does not require conclusive evidence but a focus on the evidence considered 'as a whole'. 186 The exceptional remission power, even in its modified form, was no defence because of the effect of fees and its failure in fact rather than in theory to remedy the effect: 'The problems which have been identified in these proceedings are not confined to exceptional circumstances: they are systemic.' 187 How should we explain the fundamental switch in perspective from an individual claimant to examining system-level effects? Though Lord Reed did not explain in terms why an individual focus was inappropriate, I think the key is in his conception of the rule of law, which forms the important preamble to his analysis and in which ET claims are central to the system delivering the legal rights it promises. From that starting point, it is natural to look at whether 'everyone' has effective access to ETs and empirical evidence of the operation of the Fees Order across the system rather than seeing if there were some means, legal or factual, by which a particular individual could bring a claim. If you start with the centrality of individual claims for systemic delivery, you need panoramic vision, not a microscope; and reliable statistical and other evidence of general effects becomes more, not less, relevant than what may be the idiosyncratic circumstances of an individual claimant.
B. Quasi-Proportionality
Lord Reed's second ground for holding the Fees Order to be unlawful at common law was that the degree of intrusion went further than was justified by its objectivesthe application of common law 'proportionality'. Its application enabled Lord Reed to give another lesson in elementary economics to the Lord Chancellor -higher fees do not ineluctably result in higher overall income, as any GCSE economics student knows -and once again to remind the Lord Chancellor of the lack of any rational basis or explanation for the 'price' at which fees were fixed. 188 Moreover, there was no evidence fees had in fact incentivised early settlements or discouraged weak or vexatious claims. 189 Intriguingly, and returning to the theme which informed his discussion of the rule of law, Lord Reed also indicated that the failure to consider the public benefit of claims might itself have been a further, indepedent ground of challenge. 190
C. EU and ECHR law
No doubt with an eye to the post-Brexit world, Lord Reed dealt with EU law as something of an afterthought. Dealing with the principle of effectiveness and effective judicial protection together under the umbrella of a right to an effective remedy in Article 47 of the EU Charter, he saw the essential question as depending on proportionality as interpreted by the ECtHR case-law, given how Article 52 of the Charter expressly contains a proportionality test and requires harmonisation with the corresponding EHRC rights. 191 While the answer was mostly foreshadowed by the similar principle at common law, 192 for good measure Lord Reed drew attention to the cases from Strasbourg which made clear that the test did not collapse, pace the Court of Appeal, into a single 'basic question [of] whether the fee payable is such that the claimant cannot realistically afford to pay it '. 193 On the contrary, the Strasbourg cases refer to inability to pay as only one factor among several, as part of an overarching proportionality test. 194 While inability to afford a fee probably entails a breach of Article 6, ability to pay is not a sufficient condition for compliance with it, as the cases cited by Lord Reed show. 195 For example, in Kniat v Poland, 196 a woman was required to pay a fee of PLN 10,000 to bring an appeal against findings in divorce proceedings. Because she had received a lump sum of PLN 300,000 from her ex-husband, the Poznań Court of Appeal refused to grant her an exemption. 197 The ECtHR found the fee impaired the 'very essence' of the right in Article 6 because, even though she could pay it, the lump sum was her only asset, which 'it did not seem reasonable' she spent on fees rather than on securing her and her children's needs after the divorce, and 'having regard in particular to what was at stake for the applicant '. 198 Similarly, in Cakir v Turkey, 199 in finding that payment of a relatively small court fee to obtain a written judgment as a precondition of enforcing a judgment for unpaid wages amounted to a breach of Article 6, the ECtHR ignored whether the applicants could afford the fees; instead it relied on how the state had shifted its responsibility to organise an effective system of enforcement onto the claimants, and the absence of a reasonable relationship of proportionality between the fees and the work to be done. 200
E. Comparing the Common Law with EU and ECHR Law
Lord Reed's citation of the Strasbourg cases, which influence the ECJ via Articles 47 and 52 of the Charter, should not lead us to assume a congruity between the common law and ECHR or EU law. Important differences exist, with the common law imposing a higher and more visible barrier than its European cousins, even if it is more deferential to Parliamentary supremacy than Article 47.
First, while the ECtHR usually cites the mantra that fees must not impair the 'very essence' of the right, and there must be a reasonable relationship of proportionality between the means employed and the aim of the state in raising fees, in practice the two tests are invariably elided. 201 The same applies to EU law, which increasingly views matters through the lens of Article 47 of the Charter, corresponding to Article 6 ECHR, and does not deal separately with the principle of effectiveness or whether a procedural barrier makes it 'excessively difficult' to bring a claim. By contrast, the UNISON judgment carefully formulates two independent legal principles: first, whether fees effectively prevent some persons from having access to justice; and, second, whether the intrusion is no greater than is justified by the objectives of the measure. If the latter element is analogous to proportionality under the ECHR, the former is distinctively domestic.
Second, it this first domestic principle, not proportionality, which in practice imposes the most significant barrier to impediments to access to the courts. By carefully selecting the objectives of a fees scheme, a government can steer a path around common law proportionality without undue difficulty. But the first principle is an immovable and hence more formidable obstacle. Fees always have to be set at a level everyone can afford. To underline the point, Lord Reed supplements the legal question with a clearly articulated evidential test, based on a 'real risk' to which evidence of systemic effects is relevant. The 'very essence' test under the ECHR or the 'excessively difficult' test in EU law, for example, are much less specific in relation to evidence. 202 It is one of the paradoxes of UNISON that much of the argument in the SC was directed to showing that the CA was wrong to adopt a test based on individual affordability because it should have examined fees through the lens of proportionality, whether under the common law, Article 6 ECHR or EU law, and where the diverse legal sources are broadly in harmonty. While the SC accepted this argument, it was principally its revised formulation and application of the first common law principle, based on effective access to justice, which afforded ET claimants the protection which a system based on privatised social justice implicitly demands, and which the political process had ignored or brushed aside.
SHORT-TERM CONSEQUENCES FOR EMPLOYMENT LAW
The short-term consequences of the judgment are still being worked through and are likely to result in further litigation, so in this section I only sketch out some of the issues which arise.
The first immediate and uncontroversial effect of the judgment was that fees were no longer payable for any ET claims, and ETs ceased to apply rules 11 and 40 of the ET Rules, providing for the rejection and dismissal of claims without the appropriate fee, from the day of the judgment. 203 The second consequence was that fees paid in the past fell to be reimbursed by the MoJ, based on an oral undertaking, given on behalf of the then Lord Chancellor, Chris Grayling, at the permission hearing where Lewis J refused UNISON's application for interim relief. 204 That it was not recorded in writing was perhaps a reflection of the Lord Chancellor's misplaced confidence in winning the legal arguments. The refund scheme has now been published, and provides for reimbursement of claimants, lead claimants and representatives who paid more than 85,000 ET fees, 205 as well as parties who were ordered by an ET or the EAT to pay a fee, in each case with interest. 206 As for claims rejected or dismissed in the past by ETs acting under rule 11 (issue fee) or under rule 40 (hearing fee), the thorny legal question is how a court's holding that a statutory instrument was ultra vires affects earlier actions of third parties (here ETs or the EAT) made on the assumption that the instrument was lawful. The issue is not resolved by assuming the later judgment means the subordinate legislation never had any legal effect. 207 Rather, the theoretical analysis of Forsyth, endorsed by Lord Steyn in Boddington v British Transport Police, 208 is that the answer depends upon 'whether the second actor has legal power to act notwithstanding the invalidity of the first act'. 209 But the empowering statute rarely provides any clear solution to the conundrum, and the cases are not always easy to reconcile. 210 Recent authorities have emphasised the flexibility of the exercise, based on the statutory context and the practical consequences. 211 In R (Shoesmith) v Ofsted, 212 for example, the majority of the Court of Appeal held that whether Haringey's dismissal of Ms Shoesmith was ineffective owing to its reliance on an unlawful direction of the Secretary of State depended on all the circumstances, including that Ms Shoesmith had put Haringey on notice that she considered the direction to be unlawful. 213 While this is an 'ill-defined area' of law, 214 the relevant factors all point towards automatic reinstatement of claims rejected or dismissed by ETs under rules 11 or 40. First, in UNISON Lord Reed expressly rejected the submission of the Lord Chancellor that relief should be restricted to a declaration with only prospective effect. Instead, his language was explicit on the retrospective effect of the judgment: the Fees Order was 'unlawful ab initio and must be quashed'. 215 Second, the non-payment of fees due under the Fees Order was a necessary and sufficient condition for the rejection or dismissal of claims under the Rules. 216 Third, claimants whose claims were rejected had no practicable means of challenging those decisions, so that any argument based on preserving the finality of the ET decisions bears little weight. 217 Fourth, ETs were on notice of a potential illegality finding from the time UNISON began its judicial review, before the Fees Order came into effect. 218 Fifth, it is generally harder for a public body than a private individual to invoke an exception to retrospective invalidity. 219 These arguments apply equally to EAT appeals rejected because a claimant did not pay a fee. 220 On these assumptions, ET claims and EAT appeals should simply be reinstated tout court, although there may be some practical issues to resolve where (for example) files have been lost.
What about claimants who never brought a claim at all because of the deterrent effect of fees? Here, the appropriate means of a claimant entering the ET jurisdiction is to bring a claim and argue that time should be extended on the basis it was not 'reasonably practicable' to bring a claim within the relevant limitation period (e.g. unfair dismissal 221 ) or that it is 'just and equitable' to extend time (e.g. discrimination 222 ). Prior to the SC ruling there was no practicable means of presenting a claim in the ET without paying a fee. 223 Each case will turn on factual issues specific to the individual claimant, such as whether it was practicable for the claimant to pay a fee, whether she applied for remission, and so on. Prejudice to the respondent and the effect of delay are relevant factors for the purpose of the 'just and equitable' exception 224 but are not in relation to reasonable practicability, where the focus is on why the claimant did not present the claim in time. 225 Both tests are wide enough to allow extensions where a claimant could not reasonably afford the fee, 226 and Lord Reed's observation in UNISON that fees, even if affordable, could make it 'futile or irrational' to bring claims for small amounts 227 suggests that the small size of the likely award relative to the fee can mean it was not reasonably practicable to bring a claim or that it is just and equitable to allow a late claim. 228 One ET has already treated the illegality of the Fees Order as a consideration relevant to reasonable practicability even where a claimant would have qualified for remission. 229 Despite the Supreme Court ruling that the Fees Order was in breach of EU law, I doubt there is much scope for Francovich 230 claims for damages against the Government by claimants who never brought claims owing to fees. Where a Member State has incorrectly transposed an EU obligation -as here -the test is whether it 'manifestly and gravely disregarded the exercise of its powers'. 231 In the absence of clear guidance in the wording of Article 47 of the EU Charter or in the existing caselaw of the ECJ that ET fees were probably unlawful, it is unlikely the breach would be sufficiently serious. 232
LONGER-TERM CONSEQUENCES -EMPLOYMENT AND BEYOND
In the long term the SC judgment will operate as a significant legal constraint on any reintroduction of ET fees, most powerful in relation to secondary legislation, where the common law principles provide a means of challenge unaffected by Brexit or any reawakening of proposals, currently shelved, to repeal the Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA). Because subsequent empirical evidence of the effect of fees may illustrate a 'real risk' that persons are effectively prevented from having access to ETs, or may be relevant to proportionality, any future scheme will need to be kept under constant review, signalling an important role for academics, NGOs, unions and others in producing reliable data on its actual or predicted effects.
The existing research already highlights why ET claimants are likely to be peculiarly vulnerable to fees. In addition to the low levels of awards for most ET claims, the difficulties of estimating the prospects of success in the absence of evidence, the low levels of legal advice and guidance, and the poor record of enforcement, almost all ET claimants will have been in employment recently and so in receipt of earnings. 233 SETA 2013, for example, found that 98% of claimants were current or former employees of the respondent, with 78% in permanent full-time employment, the earnings of which were slightly below the then national median. 234 Poland, 237 possessing current but diminishing capital which they will reasonably want to preserve for future basic needs rather than spend on fees. This may be a further factor explaining why ET claimants turned out to be so much more pricesensitive than the Government predicted, why the numbers who qualified for remission were so low, and why they can be predicted to be especially deterred by fees in the future (absent changes to limitation periods or remission thresholds).
The alternative is a scheme enshrined in primary legislation: for example, an Act drafted in similar terms to the Fees Order, or an Act specifically conferring power to pass secondary legislation which interferes with the right of access to a court. Until Brexit, this avenue is partially blocked because of the SC's alternative ruling that the Fees Order breached Article 47 of the EU Charter, at least in relation to the long list of employment rights which are underpinned by EU law. 238 Article 47 has direct horizontal effect and so overrides any conflicting primary legislation, as confirmed recently by the SC. 239 The possibility of an Act which, pre-Brexit, expressly and unambiguously overrides EU law 240 can probably be left to legal theory given the Government's precarious majority and the political controversy such a measure would generate in the run-up to Brexit. Should the Government introduce a modified fees scheme which it considered could tip-toe around Article 47, it too would be open to challenge based on its empirical effects. Such a move would also raise the spectre of a possible reference to the ECJ, the Brexiteers' least favourite court, and the uncertainty of how that court would respond to a restriction on the enforcement of what for it are very fundamental social rights. 241 Post-Brexit, however, the potential legal door of primary legislation will open more widely. There is already precedent for a government using primary legislation in pronouncements have been rather less contrite. Before the Justice Committee, for example, the new Lord Chancellor declined to give an assurance that ET fees would not be introduced and said that nothing in the SC judgment ruled out fees 'as a matter of principle', even if the Fees Order got the balance wrong. 251 Only the naive would think that the conflict between the Government's policies on ETs and the principles in UNISON has been resolved.
CONCLUSION
The UNISON ruling has many potential effects not restricted to fees or litigation, and I want to end by drawing attention to two.
The first is its implications for future strategic litigation. Lord Reed's articulation of the constitutional right draws no distinction between the kind of matters which effectively prevent access to justice. Its logic is not restricted to legal obstacles or barriers to bringing proceedings but could extend to the failure to take positive steps to assist individuals accessing or participating in the adjudicative process. Already, for example, the EAT has drawn on it to conclude that ETs have power to appoint a litigation friend for a claimant who lacks capacity and who could not effectively participate in proceedings without one. 252 In the absence of any clear indication that Parliament intended to impede a claimant's common law rights of access to justice (which extends to the right to a remedy), the ET Rules were to be construed to permit such an appointment. 253 Though framed in negative terms, the effect is akin to a positive duty of providing assistance to someone who needs it; and whether UNISON will be used to drive positive duties in other areas, such as access to legal advice, is an intriguing question. Lord Reed's approach to the evidence, and his rejection of the Lord Chancellor's argument that owing to the exceptional power of remission the system was not inherently unfair, also signal potential future challenges to the restricted approach the courts have taken hitherto in judicial reviews based on systemic illegality in access to justice. 254 His recognition of how employment rights aim to protect the party with weaker bargaining power, 255 
251
confirming what the SC said in Autoclenz, 256 may spill over into other, substantive areas of employment law. 257 Second, UNISON provides a powerful normative lens through which to scrutinise the practical realisation of employment and other social rights. While the limitations of legal doctrine and constitutional law preclude UNISON stretching to redress all kinds of practical impediments to enforcing employment rights, its normative claims are not so restricted. Writing in 1975, E. P. Thompson described the rule of law as an 'unqualified human good' with its own internal logic, based on universality and equity, which meant it in fact often operated to impose effective and non-arbitrary constraints on the exercise of power. 258 The conception of the rule of law in UNISON extends into new normative territory, beyond a negative constraint on administrative or private action. Where the delivery of social rights is left exclusively in the hands of individual claimants, impediments to effective legal claims or remedies risk failing citizens simultaneously in three capacities: as individual right-holders, as addressees of the laws, and as authors of the laws which led to those rights.
If this seems obvious now, it took the SC to spell it out to a Government which might as well be speaking a different language. From the Government's viewpoint, court users are participants in a surrogate market, purchasing a service for their private self-interest, whereas for the SC claimants are exercising a fundamental constitutional right and are the means of delivering the public goods on which a democracy depends. There is no means of reconciling these incommensurable visions, and the conflict between them extends far deeper than the legal arena. But for the moment UNISON is an important triumph of a revitalised rule of law over the increased commodification of legal 'services' in ersatz markets, and a reminder that the coordination of social action by law necessarily embodies claims to legitimacy which are not reducible to the language of economics. If you want to see the exemplar of Lord Reed's claim that 'access to the courts is not...only of value to the particular individuals involved' 259 it is the UNISON case itself: its effects on access to justice and the practical achievement of social rights reach far beyond the members of the union which fought the case, embracing workers in general, especially the low-paid or those claiming low amounts, and extending into other areas of privatised social justice. 
